Decedents\u27 Estates: Liability for Payment of Joint Mortgage Debt as Between Estate of Deceased Co-Owner and Survivor by Hislop, Reginald M., Jr.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 4 Spring 1959 Article 9
Decedents' Estates: Liability for Payment of Joint
Mortgage Debt as Between Estate of Deceased Co-
Owner and Survivor
Reginald M. Hislop Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Reginald M. Hislop Jr., Decedents' Estates: Liability for Payment of Joint Mortgage Debt as Between Estate of Deceased Co-Owner and
Survivor, 42 Marq. L. Rev. 555 (1959).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol42/iss4/9
RECENT DECISIONS
Rule 18 (a) permits the joinder of independent claims would not
change the result. The usual principles of jurisdiction must be met
in relation to any claim that is joined. As said in MooRE's FEDERAL
RULES :21 "It should be borne in mind that Rule 18 is only a procedural
rule relating to joinder of claims and remedies; and that under Rule
8222 jurisdiction and venue are not affected. .. "
The dismissal of a supplemental bill joining the cause of action for
wrongful death could be avoided in Wisconsin by substituting a citizen
of Illinois as administrator to continue the litigation. Unlike Virginia,
Wisconsin does not require the administrator to be a citizen of this
state. A duly appointed administrator of a foreign jurisdiction may
prosecute the action for wrongful death. The basis appears to be that
full faith and credit should be given to the judicial proceedings of the
foreign jurisdiction appointing the party as administrator of the de-
cedent's estate. 22
Grady v. Irvine illustrates the interrelation of principles of Federal
jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law of the
state where the District Court is sitting which the pleader must con-
sider in charting his course when a person has commenced an action
in the Federal District Court for personal injuries and dies as a result
of the injuries while the action is pending.
GERALD S. WALsH
Decedents' Estates: Liability for Payment of Joint Mortgage
Debt as Between Estate of Deceased Co-Owner and Survivor-
Real estate was conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by the entire-
ties. Thereafter both husband and wife executed a joint and several
bond secured by a mortgage on the realty. The husband died testate
before any mortgage payments were made. His will contained numer-
ous bequests, including a bequest to the widow of $35,000, plus a
direction for the order of payment in case the funds were insufficiint
to meet all bequests.' The document also contained a general provision
directing the executors to pay "all my just debts." During administra-
tion, it became evident that estate assets were insufficient to pay all
bequests plus the mortgage debt. The executors sought instructions
as to the percentage of the debt for which the estate was liable, the
widow contending that the estate must pay the entire debt or at least
contribute fifty percent if she paid it. The lower court refused to
award contribution to the wife and held she was solely responsible
21 Moop's FEDERAL RULES AND FoRms 128 (1956).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 82, 28 U.S.C. Rule 82 "Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected.
These rules shall not be constructed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States District Courts or the venue or the actions therein."
32 Robertson v. C., St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 122 Wis. 66, 74, 99 N.W. 1135 (1904).
'In re Keil's Estate, 140 A. 2d 139 (Orph's Ct. Del. 1958).
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for the debt upon realty.2 On appeal, Held: The widow is entitled
to fifty percent contribution from the estate of her deceased husband
when she pays the debt. In Re Keil's Estate, 145 A.2d 563 (Del. 1958).
There were several preliminary problems which confronted the
court before the contribution issue was reached. Among these was the
application of the common law doctrine of exoneration. According to
tradition, it was the obligation of the personal representative of the
deceased to exonerate from mortgage debt any realty which passed
through the estate of the deceased either by will or by intestacy. 3 The
personalty of the estate has always been considered the primary source
for exoneration of the realty under these circumstances. 4 The doctrine
operated to free realty in the hands of devisees or heirs from the per-
sonal debts of the decedent. Generally, the justification for its use was
that the estate of the decedent had been enriched by the proceeds ac-
quired when the debt was placed upon the property. Therefore, the
estate should equitably pay this debt. This was deemed to be the in-
tention of the testator. 5
The application of the common law doctrine was limited in two
ways. First, if the testator expressly stated that the realty should pass
cur onere, the estate had no duty to exonerate. Any exoneration would
have been contrary to the intention of the testator.6 Secondly, if the
debt was not a personal debt of the decedent, his estate had not been
enriched by its proceeds and consequently had no equitable duty to
exonerate the realty.' The personal estate was not considered enriched
if the debt was incurred in purchasing the realty or in making im-
provements to it.8
The doctrine of exoneration has fallen into disfavor under modem
law.9 It is seldom applied unless the testator expressly directs that a
specific piece of realty be exonerated. Most states, by statute, permit
the realty to bear the primary responsibility for the debt upon it. The
courts construe these statutes as to relieve them from the necessity of
implying testator's intent to exonerate. Application of the doctrine
appears dependent upon express direction of the testator.10
The court in the present case refused to apply exoneration. It con-
sidered the general testamentary direction to pay debts insufficient evi-
dence of testator's intent to exonerate any particular piece of realty."l
Furthermore the realty did not pass through the estate of the husband.
2 Ibid.
3 ATKINSON, WILus §137 (2nd ed. 1953).4 RoLLisox, WILLS §306 (1939).
5 See supra note 3, 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY 296-297 (Casner ed. 1952).
o ATKINSON, WILLS §135 (2nd ed. 1953).
7 Ibid.
8 See supra note 3.
9 See supra note 3, 4 PAGE, WILLS 306-307 (3rd ed. 1952).
10 See supra note 4.
"1 See supra note 3.
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This result also appears justified by the fact that the debt was placed
upon the property for improvement purposes; it was not solely the
personal obligation of the decedent since the widow joined in the
execution of the bond. The estate of the decedent was not enriched in
any way. The writer has been unable to find any instance where a
court has applied exoneration, without an express direction from the
testator, to a non-probate asset.'2
A second problem which follows closely upon the heels of exonera-
tion is that of abatement; i.e. the order in which the assets of the estate
are used to pay the decedent's debts. This question was considered
in the decision of the lower court. 13 It was not considered on appeal.
Neither court found it necessary to apply the doctrine. The widow con-
tended that the circumstances surrounding the mortgage, coupled with
the testator's language which gave her bequest of $35,000 priority over
other legacies and bequests, showed an intent that the testator con-
sidered the mortgage his personal debt. Had the court agreed with this
contention, they would have been faced with the problem of deciding
which legacies and bequests were to give way towards payment of the
debt. A general testamentary direction that testator's debts are to be
paid is considered a mere formality and standing alone has no bearing
upon the order of abatement. Here, however, the testator gave specific
instructions as to the order in which his gifts were to be paid if the
funds were insufficient to pay them all in full. The result was that the
court had to determine the extent of his just debts and then Ifollow
the order for payment of the gifts which the testator directed.' 4
The line of cases which awards fifty percent contribution to the
party paying the debt approach the problem through an examination of
the nature of the debt which the parties placed upon the property. The
obligation is that of joint and equal principals and the right to con-
tribution exists between them in this relationship.' 5 The main case
cited by the court in its decision is Cunningham v. Cunningham.'6 The
case concerned property held by husband and wife by the entireties.
The controversy arose over payment of a purchase money mortgage
which they had jointly placed upon the realty. The court refused to
apply exoneration and stated generally that the doctrine did not apply
12 See supra note 1. "The problem before the Court arises out of the relation-
ship between the debtors on account of their creation of a debt secured by a
mortgage on land held by the entireties. This problem is not solved by any
general requirement that debts of a deceased be paid by his estate" Ibid at
141.
'3 Ibid.
4 'No authority has been found upon which to predicate abatement of estate
assets to pay the debt upon a non-probate asset in the absence of some direct
and express application by the testator himself.
15 67 A.L.R. 1176 (1930).
16158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930).
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where the parties who placed the mortgage held the realty by the en-
tireties. The court stated the following:
The survivor has no interest in her deceased husband's estate as
dowress, heir, or devisee, or in any other capacity which entitles
her to have the land acquired by her as a tenant by the entireites
exonerated, by payments out of the personal assets, from the
mortgage indebtedness contracted for its purchase."
The court then awarded contribution of fifty percent between the
parties because of their relationship as co-principals upon the note
which secured the mortgage. This was decided to be the only equitable
solution to the problem.
Several other cases cited by the widow in the principal case to sup-
port her contention for contribution from the personal estate proceed
upon the same reasoning. In In Re Kershaw's Estate, Justice Stern
said:
. . . the controlling fact is that he, together with his wife, was
personally liable on the bond; that liability continued after his
death and therefore constituted a debt of his estate.18
In the case of Magenheimer v. Councilman, the court said:
They were joint principals each liable for the whole debt and the
husband's administrator having paid the note as a claim against
the husband's estate, was entitled to contribution for the estate.1 9
Underwood v. Ward2O also applied equitable contribution of fifty per-
cent between husband and wife who were jointly and severally liable
for a debt placed upon their property.
The decision of the lower court, reversed on appeal, rested upon
the reasoning that the nature of the obligation of the deceased spouse
is to be considered in the light of the incidents of ownership of the
property which is security for the debt. The nature of the debt is
considered to be subordinated to the nature of the tenancy by which
the parties hold the land. Under a tenancy by the entireties both own
the whole interest and the courts which advocate this theory consider
that they both mortgage the whole as individuals. The obligation of
contribution and the debt of the one simply disappears when, by his
death, he loses all his interest in the property under the principal of
survivorship. According to this view the death of one holder eliminates
any basis for an award of equitable contribution.
The leading case cited for this latter view is Lopez v. Lopez. 21
This Florida case was decided upon the same facts as the principal
17 Ibid.
18352 Pa. 205, 42 A. 2d 538 (1945).
19 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919).
20239 N.C. 513, 80 S.E. 2d 267 (1954).
2190 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
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case except that the debt was for purchase money rather than im-
provements. The court said:
The husband and wife simultaneously each own the whole of
the estate and the burden of the mortgage follows the security.
•.. It is inequitable for the law to take from one his interest in
lands but yet to hold him responsible for a part of the purchase
price thereof which remains unpaid.
Two other cases cited also came to the same conclusion regarding
the nature of the tenancy. The court said in In Re Dell's Estate:
The wife joined in both the bond and the mortgage, so that the
debt became her debt as well as that of her husband and, upon
the latter's death, the mortgage was no longer upon his estate
in land, for there was none.
22
It cannot be denied that the peculiar incidents of survivorship under
a tenancy by the entireties seem to have an important place in these
decisions. This even more apparent when the final decision of Ratte
v. Ratte23 is examined. Here the tenancy of husband and wife was
joint rather than by the entireties but the court reached the same con-
clusion as the Lopez case. The court said:
The right to contribution arises when and not before a debt is
paid by one debtor for the benefit of all joint debtors. By pay-
ment of the mortgage after the death of the wife, the husband
no longer benefited her since at her death he became the sole
owner of the property.
It is significant that this case appears to give weight to the incident
of survivorship which is present in joint tenancy situations.
The two views expressed by the above lines of cases do not seem
to lend themselves to reconciliation. They are simply two divergent
approaches to the same problem. One considers the nature of the debt
as a starting point while the other uses a property approach. The courts
of any state which face this situation must make their own decision
as to the best method of approach. It is probable that the public policy
of the state and the statutory provisions dealing with tenancy and debts
will materially affect their decision.
Wisconsin does not recognize a tenancy by the entireties.24 By
statute, if realty is conveyed to husband and wife during coverture
they hold as joint tenants.2- However, there appears to be a significant
22 154 Misc. 216, 276 N.Y.S. 960 (1935).
23260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927).
24 Wallace v. St. John, 119 Wis. 585, 97 N.W. 197 (1903).25 WIs. STATS. §230.44 (1957) "All grants and devises of land made to two or
more persons, except as provided in section 230.45, shall be construed to
create estates in common, and not in joint tenancy, unless expressly declared
to be in joint tenancy."
Wis. STATS. §230.45(1) (1957) "Section 230.44 shall not apply to mortgages




difference in the joint tenancy of husband and wife in homestead prop-
erty when compared with a tenancy in non-homestead property. In
the former, survivorship cannot be destroyed by one tenant's action
alone as it can in a normal joint tenancy of non-homestead property.2 6
This is true at least as long as the property continues to be used as a
homestead.2 7 It would seem that there is a similarity between the in-
cident of survivorship of a tenancy by the entireties and the Wisconsin
joint tenancy of homestead property by husband and wife. This simi-
larity might lend some weight to an application of the rule of the Lopez
case to a similar situation in Wisconsin, if it were not for a broad
statutory provision which seems to commit Wisconsin to the principal
of equitable contribution between joint debtors.28 The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court has not been confronted with the problem of applying this
statute to a joint debt secured by a lien on realty owned by the debtors
as joint tenants. Existing decisions have been limited to tenants in
common and partnerships.2 9 However, the wording of the statute is
such that it could easily be applied to the facts of the principal case, and
it is extremely doubtful that a joint tenancy in the property securing
the debt would justify a refusal to apply the statute. Hence, if the
testator wishes such property to pass to the surviving tenant debt-free,
his will should be carefully worded to express this intention. The
statute does not appear to prohibit a testator from achieving this result
if he so desires. Mortgage insurance would also achieve the desired
result.
REGINALD M. HISLOP, JR.
Constitutional Law: Loyalty Oath - Tax Exemption-In an
attempt to effectuate a provision of the California Constitution
which requires that tax exemption be denied all persons who advo-
26 Wis. STATS. §235.01(2) (1957) "No mortgage or other alienation by a mar-
ried man of his homestead, exempt by law from execution, or any interest
therein, legal or equitable, present or future, by deed or otherwise, shall be
valid without his wife's consent, evidenced by her act of joining in the same
deed, mortgage or conveyance, except a conveyance from husband to wife."
Wis. STATS. §235.01(3) (1957) "No mortgage or other alienation by a
married woman of any interest legal or equitable, present or future, by deed
or otherwise, in a homestead held by her and her husband as joint tenants,
shall be valid without her husband's consent, evidenced by his act of joining
in the same conveyance or mortgage or executing a separate conveyance from
wife to husband."
27 Siegel v. Clemons, 266 Wis. 369, 63 N.W. 2d 725 (1954).
28 Wis. STATS. §313.12 (1957) "When two or more persons shall be indebted on
any joint contract or upon a judgment founded on a joint contract and either
of them shall die his estate shall be liable therefor, and the claim may be
allowed by the court as if the contract had been joint and several or as if the
judgment had been against him alone, and the other parties to such joint
contract may be compelled to contribute or to pay the same if they would have
been liable to do so upon payment thereof by the deceased."
29 McLaughlin v. The Estate of Curtis, 27 Wis. 644 (1871); W. E. Smith Lum-
ber Co. v. Estate of Fitzhugh, 167 Wis. 355, 167 N.W. 455 (1918).
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